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In 1987 Congress expanded the scope of the Clean Water Act to include combined sewer
overflows (CSOs) despite continuing to reduce federal assistance for water-pollution
abatement and despite the fact that CSO abatement is far more costly than previous
water-quality mandates. As a result, many low-income deindustrializing cities are now
subject to an additionalfederal mandate that many of them cannot afford without exten-
sive federal or state assistance. The authors conclude that, in lieu of increasedfederal
funding for CSO abatement, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency regulatory guide-
lines and the Clean Water Act be amended to include an assessment of the fiscal and
economic impact of CSO mandates. Such action would provide a basis for targeting the
available resources where needs are greatest and the effect of CSO abatement is likely
to result in tangible beneficial uses.
It is the national policy that federal financial assistance be provided to construct publicly
owned waste treatment works. — Clean Water Act of 1977
The Nature and Distribution of Combined Sewer Overflows
In most U.S. cities, sewer lines and stormwater collection systems were first constructed
in the 1800s and early 1900s. Typically, sewer lines designed to carry raw sewage from
urban residential areas and business districts were laid first. These were followed by
stormwater drainage systems designed to collect rainwater during storms to reduce or
eliminate urban flooding. In many cases, sewer lines and stormwater conduits were
connected into a combined sewer, namely, a single collection system that conveys both
sewage and stormwater.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that there are more than
1,300 combined sewers in the United States serving approximately 1,100 communities
with a total population of 43 million people. 1 Combined sewers are located primarily,
although not exclusively, in the Northeast and Great Lakes areas. Eleven states in these
two geographic areas account for 85 percent of the water-quality problems attributed to
CSOs nationwide (see Figure l). 2 Only eight states account for 70 percent of the
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assessed construction needs for water-pollution abatement caused by combined sewer
overflows (see Figure 2). 3
In their earliest phase of development, sewer lines and stormwater collection
systems were designed to discharge directly into receiving waters such as rivers, lakes,
bays, and estuaries. These plans were developed long before the adverse health and
environmental effects of such discharges were understood by scientists, government
officials, and the general public. However, as part of an emerging public awareness and
concern over such effects, the U.S. Congress passed the U.S. Public Health Act and the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948. Cities and towns that had not already done
so were required to build primary wastewater treatment facilities to strain and disinfect
raw sewage before discharging it into receiving waters.
In addition to the construction of primary treatment facilities, municipalities with
combined sewers encountered a derivative problem. Publicly owned treatment works
(POTWs) are designed to process normal dry-weather sewage flows that come to the
treatment facility from the collection system. During rainfalls, additional flows of
stormwater enter a combined sewer through street inlets. The combined sewage flow
and stormwater runoff often exceed the intake capacities of a POTW. Thus, if a
combined sewer can discharge only through the POTW, the treatment facility is
overloaded with stormwater and causes an extreme outfall of untreated combined
sewage into the receiving waters; to prevent an overload of the POTW, excess flows
may be contained in the collection system, where they back up and cause localized
flooding of combined sewage in residential areas and business districts.
The standard solution to the problem of excess combined flows has been to construct
diversionary chambers at key points throughout a collection system. As Figure 3 illus-












that partially block outfalls to receiving waters with either a fixed or movable intercep-
tor. Under normal dry-weather conditions, raw sewage flows are diverted into lines that
carry them to the publicly owned treatment works where sewage is treated before being
discharged into receiving waters.
During a storm, the water level rises in a combined sewer, and by design, the excess
combined sewer flow (CSF) begins to overflow the interceptors and discharges directly
into receiving waters without treatment. Combined sewer overflows contain not only
untreated sewage, but stormwater runoffs entering the system gather dry-weather pol-
lutants that have accumulated on the streets, in the gutters, and on the roofs of build-
ings. In addition, dry-weather sediments that have accumulated in the sewers are resus-
pended as the velocity of combined flow increases with the rising volume of storm
water. 4 Therefore, the untreated effluents of a combined sewer overflow often contain
unhealthy and environmentally dangerous levels of fecal matter, sediment, microorgan-
isms, oil and grease, toxic metals, organic pollutants, and other storm debris. 5
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act: An Evolving National Policy
The problem of water pollution caused by untreated or inadequately treated waste-
water was revisited by the U.S. Congress in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972. This legislation established the fundamental principles and
objectives of a national wastewater management policy. Section 101(a) of that
legislation established an ambitious national mandate by declaring the following:
The Objective of this Act is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters. In order to achieve this objective it is
hereby declared that, consistent with the provisions of this Act—
(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters
be eliminated by 1985;
(2) it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an interim goal of water quality
which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife
and provides for recreation in and on the water be achieved by July 1, 1983;
(3) it is the national policy that the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts
be prohibited;
(4) it is the national policy that federal financial assistance be provided to construct
publicly owned waste treatment works.
To achieve these goals, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972 established a national program to regulate the discharge of pollutants into surface
waters. The legislation created a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES), which requires point-source polluters to obtain a permit for discharges into
U.S. waters. Generally, point sources consist of industrial process wastewater outfalls
and sewage outfalls from municipal treatment plants. 6 The legislative guidelines for the
NPDES require point-source dischargers to comply with specific technology-based
requirements. For instance, the effluent limitations for all publicly owned treatment
works are based on levels achieved by the implementation of secondary treatment. 7
Under the 1972 legislation, individual states can assume authority for the
administration of NPDES once their permitting processes are approved by the EPA. The
law requires that state water-quality standards be consistent with federal policy but, if
necessary to achieve the act's objectives, states are allowed to impose water-quality
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standards more stringent than those required by federal regulations. Thirty-eight states
operate EPA-approved NPDES permitting programs.
The 1972 legislation explicitly linked the achievement of national water-quality goals
to federal financial assistance for municipalities affected by the new mandate (Section
101[a][4]). The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 implemented
this linkage by creating a Construction Grants Program (CGP) that provided deep
subsidies for the construction of publicly owned treatment works. The EPA was charged
with administering the Construction Grants Program. Moreover, to provide guidance to
Congress in funding the CGP, the EPA is required to develop biennial estimates "of the
cost of construction of all needed publicly owned treatment works in each of the States"
(Section 516 [b]).
The Clean Water Act of 1977
The national water-quality goals established by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 were incorporated unchanged into the Clean Water Act of 1977,
which otherwise extensively amended the earlier legislation. Significantly, for the first
time, section 70 of the Clean Water Act specifically directed the EPA to "report on the
status of combined sewer overflows in municipal treatment works operations" by the
following year. 8 Combined sewer overflows from publicly owned treatment works were
not covered explicitly by NPDES in either the 1972 or the 1977 legislation. NPDES
regulates point sources of water pollution, while scientists, engineers, and EPA officials
considered combined sewer overflows to be nonpoint sources of pollution. Conse-
quently, it was generally assumed that stormwater discharges from combined sewer
overflows were exempt from NPDES permits and, for this reason, CSOs were never
specifically covered by the EPA's original NPDES regulations. 9
Nevertheless, various legal challenges in the federal courts questioned the prevailing
interpretation of the regulatory status of CSOs. The federal courts recognized storm-
water and CSO discharges as point sources of water pollution. Therefore, communities
that had met the NPDES technology-based requirement for secondary treatment at their
POTWs were increasingly deemed subject to legal and regulatory action for combined
sewer overflows that violated the water-quality standards established by the Clean Water
Act of 1977.
Congress made a major policy departure by embracing the federal courts' opinion
on this matter in the Water Quality Act of 1987. 10 Section 405 of the act amended
the earlier legislation to require NPDES compliance for any stormwater discharge "that
contributes to a violation of a water-quality standard or is a significant contributor
of pollutants to waters of the United States." In this regard, the legislation directed the
EPA to establish permit application requirements regulating municipal stormwater
discharges. The EPA issued a national combined sewer overflow control strategy on
September 8, 1989. The strategy emphasizes, quite explicitly, that CSOs are point
sources of pollution subject to NPDES permits. 11
The strategy, covering approximately 1,100 municipahties, establishes three major
criteria for CSO control. 12
• The policy allows no more than an average of four overflows per year
for an urban area, and no more than five in rural areas.
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• The policy calls for treatment of at least 85 percent of the volume of the
combined sewage in the combined sewer system during rainfall events
on a systemwide average basis.
• The policy establishes nine other minimum controls that prohibit CSO dis-
charges in dry weather, regulate solid materials, require proper mainte-
nance and monitoring of CSO facilities, and require public notification of
CSO discharges. 13
The new control strategy also directed the individual states to develop statewide CSO
permitting strategies by January 1, 1990. More than thirty states had received EPA
approval for their CSO control strategies as of April 6, 1992. 14
Federal Funding of Water Pollution Abatement
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 established an ambitious national
mandate to improve water quality over a relatively short period of time. Subsequent
amendments to the original legislation (1977, 1981) have reiterated the same national
goals, then extending those goals in 1987 to include the problem of combined sewer
overflows. A crucial component of the original national mandate was the establishment
of a "national policy that federal financial assistance be provided to construct publicly
owned waste treatment works" (Section 101 [a] [4]).
As noted above, the 1972 act, Section 201(a), established the Title II Construction
Grants Program to support "the development and implementation of waste treatment
management plans and practices which will achieve the goals of this Act." Initially, the
program provided direct federal grants to municipalities and special districts for the
construction of publicly owned treatment works, including CSO projects. The federal
grants normally covered 75 percent of the cost of constructing the most cost-effective
alternative for providing the necessary wastewater treatment. 15
The 1972 and 1977 legislation allotted funds from the Construction Grants Program
among the individual states "in the ratio that the estimated cost of constructing all
needed publicly owned treatment works in each State bears to the estimated cost of
construction of all needed publicly owned treatment works in all of the States" (Section
205 [a]). Each state's allotment under this formula was allocated directly to municipali-
ties and special districts for individual construction projects on the basis of state priority
ratings developed by each state. The federal regulations governing the EPA's Construc-
tion Grants Program specified that states were to rate individual projects within their
jurisdiction on the basis of four criteria: (1) severity of the pollution problem; (2) size
of the population affected; (3) the need for preservation of high quality waters; (4) at
the state's option, the category of need addressed. 16
The categories of need consisted of secondary treatment, more stringent treatment,
correction of infiltration and inflow problems, sewer system replacement or major
rehabilitation, new collectors and appurtenances, new interceptors and appurtenances,
and the correction of combined sewer overflow problems. 17 Each state was given sole
authority to determine the relative weight of each of the four criteria, as well as sole
authority to determine the priority of the various categories of need. Thus, whether a
given combined sewer overflow project fell within a fundable part of a state's priority
list depended on state policy.
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Furthermore, the EPA stipulated that combined sewer overflow projects could qualify
for federal grant assistance only if several additional criteria had been met:
• The proposed level of CSO control was necessary to protect a beneficial use
of the receiving water even after technology-based standards had been
achieved by industrial point sources and at least secondary treatment had
been achieved for dry-weather municipal flows;
• Secondary treatment of dry-weather municipal flows had been achieved, or
provision for funding of secondary treatment had already been made;
• The proposed CSO control technique would be more cost effective than
other CSO control techniques or adding higher than secondary treatment
for dry-weather municipal flows;
• The marginal costs were not substantial compared with marginal benefits. 18
As noted above, the Clean Water Act of 1977 directed the EPA to "report on the
status of combined sewer overflows in municipal treatment works operations" and to
conduct a CSO needs assessment based on current applications for CSO project funding
under the CGP. The act further stipulated that the report determine the number of years
necessary, "assuming an annual authorization and appropriation for the construction
grants program of S5,000,000,000, to correct combined sewer overflow problems" (33
U.S.C. 1375, Section 70[c]). Based on this fiscal assumption, the EPA estimated that it
would take a minimum of ten years to complete CSO control under optimal conditions
and perhaps as many as forty years to correct in some states. 19 However, in calculating
these estimates the EPA emphasized to Congress and the president "the importance of
maintaining constant buying power in the construction grants program if CSO correction
is to be achieved in a reasonable period of time."20 In fact, federal outlays for the
Construction Grants Program increased during the 1970s, but actual outlays never
reached the S5 billion promised by the 1977 legislation (see Figure 4). CGP outlays
reached a peak of only S4.3 billion in fiscal year 1980 and have been declining since
that time.
Indeed, the Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction Grant Amendments of
1981 marked the beginning of a formal retreat in the federal government's financial
commitment to national water-quality goals. First, the amendments imposed a require-
ment that, effective October 1, 1984, no less than 80 percent of each state's CGP allot-
ment "shall be made only for projects for secondary treatment or more stringent treat-
ment, or any cost effective alternative thereto, new interceptors and appurtenances, and
infiltration-in-flow correction" (33 U.S.C. 1281, Section 201[g][l]). This change effec-
tively mandated secondary treatment as the top priority for the Construction Grants
Program, even as federal courts were bringing CSO problems under the jurisdiction
of the Clean Water Act.
The effect of this change was partially offset by two other components of the legisla-
tion. Beginning in fiscal year 1983, a separate appropriation of S200 million per fiscal
year was authorized specifically to address the water-quality problems of marine bays
and estuaries affected by discharges from combined stormwater and sanitary sewer
overflows. However, only 10 percent of U.S. combined sewer facilities affect marine
bays and estuaries. 21 The EPA was authorized to use funds from a state's regular CGP
allotment for CSO construction projects, but only where the correction of CSO
problems was deemed a major priority in the state's ranking system and only if
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Government Printing Office, 1973-1981)
Third, and most important, the Construction Grant Amendments of 1981 reduced
the federal contribution for the construction of publicly owned treatment works from
75 percent to 55 percent of construction costs. 22 In addition, the 1981 amendments low-
ered the annual authorizations for the Construction Grants Program and, accordingly,
federal outlays for the construction of publicly owned treatment works began a steady
decline that has continued unabated for sixteen years, even though the original water-
quality goals and mandates remain the same as in the 1970s (see Figure 5).
Congress clearly understood that the sharp and protracted decline in federal assis-
tance initiated by the 1981 amendments would create difficulties for municipalities cur-
rently or potentially subject to federal court orders. Section 26 of the 1981 amendments
cited "the sense of the Congress that judicial notice should be taken of this Act and of
the amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act made by this Act, including
reduced authorization levels under section 207 of such Act." While such decisions
remain within the discretion of individual judges and courts, it was unquestionably the
intent of Congress that the judiciary take special notice of the hardship created for
municipalities by reduced federal funding. Consequently, Section 26 of the 1981 amend-
ments directs that "parties to Federal consent decrees establishing a deadline, schedule,
or timetable for the construction of publicly owned treatment works are encouraged to
reexamine the provisions of such consent decrees and, where required by equity, to
make appropriate adjustments in such provisions."23
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Figure 5
Construction Grants Program:
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Source: Office of the President, The Budget of the United States Government: Appendix (Washington, D.C. :
Government Printing Office, 1981-1993)
Significantly, even when federal funding levels were at their peak for the Construc-
tion Grants Program, EPA needs assessments indicated that "the construction grant
monies allocated to each region and state have never been sufficient to cover every
proposed project [even though] few sewage facilities can be constructed without federal
assistance."
24 Nevertheless, in its first year (FY 1981), the Construction Grant Amend-
ments reduced the CGP spending authorization to $3.9 billion. In the time covered by
the amendments, spending authorizations fell steadily to $2.9 billion in FY 1988. 25
Overall, federal construction-related expenditures for sewage treatment facilities
dropped by 48 percent in constant dollars from 1980 to 1988, despite EPA warnings
that constant-dollar buying power would have to be sustained to achieve federal water-
pollution mandates within the time frame established by the 1977 and 1987 legislation. 26
Moreover, EPA needs assessments indicate that by 1985 CSO projects had become the
largest unmet need in the federal Construction Grants Program even though Congress
mandated that secondary treatment be given top priority for funding. The EPA's most
conservative estimate is that CSO control will require more than $23 billion in capital
expenditures to reach the goals established by the Clean Water Act. 27
Nevertheless, the erosion of federal support for the construction of publicly owned
treatment works continued with the Water Quality Act of 1987. The federal spending
authorization for construction of POTWs was reduced by another 75 percent, from $2.4
billion in FY 1988 to only $600 million in FY 1994. The act attempts to partially offset
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the effect of these reductions on municipalities by mandating increased state contribu-
tions to the construction of treatment facilities.
The Water Quality Act enforced the state mandate by requiring the states to create
state water pollution control revolving funds (SRFs) by September 30, 1989. The act
authorizes annual federal appropriations to the SRFs, with each state's allotment defined
as a fixed percentage of the total annual federal appropriation for all SRFs. However,
in order to receive its federal allotment, each state must enter into a binding capitaliza-
tion grant agreement with the EPA. These agreements require a state to match every
four dollars in federal allotments with one state dollar. Thus, each state is expected
annually to provide at least 20 percent of the total capitalization for its state revolving
fund. The state must make its contribution to the SRF, in quarterly installments, on or
before the date of the federal contribution. Moreover, in contrast to the earlier Construc-
tion Grants Program, the SRFs are authorized only to make loans to municipalities at
below-market to zero interest rates. Loan recipients are required to establish a dedicated
source of revenue, usually sewer fees, for repayment of the loan. Annual principal and
interest payments must commence no later than one year after completion of the project
and be fully amortized not later than twenty years after completion of the project.
However, as state governments plunged into fiscal crisis in the early 1990s, they
increasingly slashed discretionary spending in order to balance budgets and to fund
entitlements. In fiscal years 1992 and 1993, thirty-four states implemented spending
reductions. 28 In this context, a recent National Conference of State Legislatures survey
of state legislative budget officers suggests that funding environmental projects has been
relegated to a fiscal nonissue as state governments seek to eliminate deficits, with
funding going to costly entitlement programs such as Medicaid, Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, K-12 education, and prisons. 29 One consequence of inadequately
financed state revolving funds is that more and more municipalities are locked in
confrontations with federal courts and the EPA over mandated CSO projects that
many municipalities simply cannot afford to finance without extensive federal or
state assistance.
Indeed, the problem of unfunded CSO mandates has become such a significant
municipal issue that a special CSO Partnership was established by twenty-five
municipalities during the 1988 annual congress of the National League of Cities. By
1989 one hundred twenty-five municipalities had joined the partnership in an effort to
secure more flexible CSO regulations and more federal funding to aid local compliance
with those regulations. The CSO Partnership contends that under existing guidelines,
CSO control will exceed the financial capacities of many municipalities, particularly
older cities with a limited tax base and a plethora of more pressing capital needs such
as schools and fire and police protection. 30
Case Study: CSO Abatement in Fall River, Massachusetts
The city of Fall River, Massachusetts, a member of the CSO Partnership, illustrates the
dilemma faced by many old industrial and, increasingly, deindustrialized northeastern
cities where the most serious combined sewer overflow problems are concentrated in the
United States. Fall River, a coastal city with approximately 92,000 residents, is located
in southeastern Massachusetts about twenty miles east of Providence, Rhode Island. The
history of wastewater treatment in Fall River closely parallels the national pattern of
wastewater facilities development. Fall River's original sewer system was designed and
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constructed in the years 1820 to 1850. For the most part, its current combined sewer
system was constructed between 1910 and 1930. Until 1952 the combined system dis-
charged untreated sewage and stormwater runoff directly into adjacent Mount Hope
Bay, the Quechechan River, and the Taunton River.
In response to the federal mandates contained in the U.S. Public Health Act and the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Fall River constructed a publicly owned
primary wastewater treatment plant (1948-1952). The facility provided primary treat-
ment for normal dry-weather sewer flows and discharged the treated effluents into
Mount Hope Bay. Fall River's primary treatment facility was upgraded in 1961 and
1971. Finally, in compliance with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972, the city initiated the design and planning of a secondary wastewater treatment
facility. It was constructed from 1979 to 1981, with 75 percent of the project's $36
million cost defrayed by the EPA's Construction Grants Program. Because an additional
15 percent of the construction cost was defrayed by the state, Fall River was required to
provide only 10 percent of the capital necessary to comply with the federal mandate.
Finally, during the last decade, the city voluntarily implemented an industrial pretreat-
ment program. 31 This series of improvements to Fall River's wastewater treatment
process produced a system that complied with the water-quality standards established
under the water control amendments of 1972 and with the provisions of the Clean Water
Act of 1977. The city's most recent environmental study indicates that under dry-weath-
er conditions, discharges from the city's sewer system no longer disturb water quality
sufficiently to affect the normal life of receiving waters.
However, because the Water Quality Act of 1987 defined combined sewer overflows
as a point source of pollution, Fall River responded to changing federal policy by com-
missioning a Phase I CSO facilities plan, which was completed by the Maguire Group,
Inc., in November 1987. As a result of findings reported in the plan, Fall River imple-
mented a further $12 million rehabilitation of its combined sewer to reduce infiltration
inflows to the system. The city also instituted new collection system controls that
include the routine cleaning of sewer lines to reduce back pressure and the addition
of weirs to the CSO structures to prevent outflows during low-flow periods. These
improvements have virtually eliminated dry-weather CSOs and limited CSO discharges
during periods of light rainfall. 32
Yet during moderate to heavy rainfalls, excess flows continue to build up in the com-
bined sewer and discharge, untreated, into receiving waters. Currently the city's com-
bined sewer has nineteen outfall points that discharge into Mount Hope Bay (13), the
Quechechan River (4), and the Taunton River (2). These outfalls are estimated to con-
tribute about 941 million gallons per year of untreated wastewater to the receiving
waters. 33 Fecal coliform is the main pollutant discharged during Fall River's combined
sewer overflows, although the most recent study of their environmental impact indicates
that after a combined sewer overflow, fecal coliform levels in Mount Hope Bay return to
prestorm levels within twenty-four to forty-eight hours. 34
Nevertheless, after the Environmental Protection Agency released its combined sewer
overflow control strategy in August 1989, the anticipated change in administrative
policy placed Fall River in technical violation of its National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System permit, mainly because of the combined sewer overflows that occur
during moderate to heavy rainfall. On September 29, 1989, the EPA issued an adminis-
trative order to the city of Fall River, citing the discharge of untreated storm and sani-
tary wastewater from the nineteen combined sewer outfalls as a violation of its NPDES
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permit (MAO 100382). The administrative order required the city to submit a Phase II
draft CSO facilities plan to the EPA and to the Massachusetts Department of Environ-
mental Protection (MDEP) by November 1, 1990. The Phase II plan was required to
assess alternative solutions to the Fall River CSO problem and to recommend a solution
in conformity with EPA and MDEP planning guidelines. 35
Phase II planning resulted in a recommendation that Fall River construct an off-line
deep-tunnel storage facility. The consultant's recommendation is to bore a 4.6 mile, 1 8-
foot-diameter tunnel 150 feet below ground, giving the tunnel a storage capacity of 48.3
million gallons. During periods of rainfall, excess combined sewer flows would be rout-
ed into the deep tunnel and stored so that combined flows neither overload the treatment
facility nor discharge into receiving waters. Once rainfalls end and flow levels to the
treatment facility return to normal, excess wastewater stored in the deep tunnel would
be pumped to the publicly owned treatment works, where it can receive primary and
secondary treatment. The proposed deep-tunnel storage alternative will not entirely
eliminate combined sewer overflows, but it will reduce the number of CSOs to four per
year, a level of CSO abatement sufficient to comply with the EPA's CSO control policy
and the MDEP's combined sewer overflow strategy. 36
In the meantime, the city of Fall River was also sued by the New England Conserva-
tion Law Foundation, Inc., under provisions of the Clean Water Act. The U.S. District
Court, District of Massachusetts, issued an enforcement order on March 11, 1992, which
dictated a strict planning and construction timetable for the proposed CSO fa-
cility in Fall River. 37 The federal court's timetable is consistent with the schedule
for statewide CSO control established by the Massachusetts Department of Environ-
mental Protection, which estimates that CSO abatement in the state will take at least
fifteen to twenty years. However, the document establishing the statewide CSO control
strategy also acknowledges that "the limitation in funds will be the major obstacle to
achieving water-quality standards in [the state's] CSO impacted areas."38
Funding CSO Abatement
The total capital cost of the proposed deep-tunnel storage facility in Fall River is
estimated to be $115 million. This mandated cost is imposed despite the fact that Fall
River remains in a chronic condition of economic and fiscal distress.39 For instance, its
economy depends heavily on a declining manufacturing base that still accounts directly
for more than one-third of all the city's employment and wages. Since 1986, Fall
River's total employment base has declined by more than 7 percent, for a net loss of
2,659 jobs. This figure is roughly 50 percent higher than that for statewide job losses
during the same period; similarly, unemployment over the entire course of the last bus-
iness cycle was approximately 50 percent higher than the statewide average. As of
March 1996, the city's unemployment rate was more than 14 percent and exceeded
19 percent during the trough of the 1990-1991 recession.
Not surprisingly, standard measurements of Fall River's fiscal capacity indicate that
the city's ability to raise revenue locally is far below average. First, Fall River residents
are among the poorest in the state of Massachusetts. Fall River's per capita income of
$10,966 (1989) is only 62 percent of the statewide average and ranks 348th of 351
Massachusetts municipalities. Similarly, Fall River's median household income of
$22,452 (1990) is only 54 percent of the statewide average and ranks 347th of the 351
municipalities. Second, while the main own-source revenue for Massachusetts munici-
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palities is the property tax, Fall River's residential, commercial, and industrial property
values are in a chronically depressed condition. In 1992, total assessed property values
per capita in Fall River were S30,752, or only 49 percent of the statewide average, that
is, 347th. Consequently, the city has been heavily dependent on state local aid; yet,
because of the state's own fiscal crisis, this source of revenue declined by more than
20 percent after fiscal year 1989.
Despite the city's distressed economic condition and abnormally low fiscal capacity,
the expectations for federal and state assistance continue to diminish each year. As
already documented, federal assistance for wastewater construction projects has been
declining for more than a decade, and current authorizations for spending under the
Water Quality Act indicate that this trend will continue for the foreseeable future. At the
same time, state finances in Massachusetts, as elsewhere, are only beginning to emerge
from the severe fiscal crisis that began in 1989.40 Indeed, recent analyses by state leg-
islative budget officers and others project that state finances will remain precarious in
most states for the near future. 41 Finally, as a result of declining federal and state assis-
tance for water pollution abatement, the financial capacities of the Massachusetts state
revolving fund appear inadequate to support the numerous abatement projects eligible
for funding.
As previously noted, passage of the Water Quality Act of 1987 dramatically altered
the Construction Grants Program by shifting the main responsibility for administering
wastewater treatment grants from the Environmental Protection Agency to the state
revolving funds. In 1989, the commonwealth of Massachusetts complied with the
requirements of the Water Quality Act by creating a state revolving fund under Chapter
275 of the Massachusetts General Laws. The fund is managed as the Massachusetts
Water Pollution Abatement Trust (MWPAT) under the Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Protection.
Nationwide, CSO abatement has been costing from SI,300 to S2,500 per capita for
households served by a combined sewer system.42 Thus, estimates based on these aver-
ages predict that CSO abatement in Massachusetts will require from S2.5 billion to
S4.9 billion in capital outlays over the next fifteen years and, in fact, the EPA's total
documented needs for CSO abatement in Massachusetts already exceed S2.7 billion.43
Three CSO projects alone, serving eleven of its twenty-six affected communities, have a
known cost of more than S2 billion— Boston/Massachusetts Water Resource Authority
at SI.6 billion, Lower Connecticut River Valley at S350 million, and Fall River at $115
million.
Hence, to meet the timetable established by the state's CSO control strategy, the
MWPAT would need to advance approximately S300 million annually in capital outlays
simply to address the state's CSO problem. However, in its first four years the MWPAT
received state and federal capitalization funds sufficient to issue only $120 million in
loans. The MWPAT's financial plan predicted that S661 million in new projects would
be funded through 1995, but nearly three-quarters (74%) of that sum was allocated to
the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority for the Boston Harbor cleanup and to the
city of New Bedford for the construction of a secondary treatment facility. 44 It is evident
that the current and anticipated resources of the MWPAT are inadequate to meet CSO
water-quality mandates within a fifteen-year time frame, particularly since secondary
treatment remains a higher-level priority in the competition for limited funds.
As a result, Massachusetts, like many states, has gradually been shifting the costs
of federal water pollution mandates onto municipalities. The state's original SRF guide-
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lines established so-called 45 percent grant equivalency awards for municipal water
pollution abatement projects deemed federally eligible and, therefore, entered on the
MDEP's state priority list. A 45 percent grant equivalency is achieved by advancing the
full capital cost of a project as a loan to the municipality. Interest payments on the loan
are heavily subsidized from reserve and equity funds controlled by the MWPAT and are
further defrayed by annual payments made to the MWPAT by the state on behalf of
municipalities with outstanding loans. The effect of these subsidies is that a 45 percent
award appears to the recipient to be a loan amortized at approximately 3 percent simple
interest over twenty years.
Significantly, the Massachusetts DEP's original policy intent was to also provide 75
percent grant equivalency awards for priority-listed projects in so-called hardship com-
munities. A 75 percent grant equivalency is achieved by first advancing the full capital
cost of a project to the eligible municipality. The MWPAT raises the grant from 45 per-
cent to 75 percent by forgiving 25 percent of the loan, effectively writing off this por-
tion of the principal. The remaining principal is repaid at near zero percent subsidized
simple interest.
When Phase I planning of the Fall River CSO project was approved for construction
grants funding in 1983, it received, as a hardship community, an outright 90 percent
grant rather than a loan. Thus, as the project developed over the following decade, it
was widely expected by city officials, business leaders, and citizens that the remainder
of the project— Phase II design and Phase III construction— would continue to qual-
ify for at least a 75 percent grant equivalency award under the MDEP's hardship
provisions.
However, the original design and program guidelines for the state revolving fund
were premised on fiscal conditions that ceased to exist soon after the program's start-
up in 1989. As the state's fiscal condition failed to improve significantly, MWPAT
guidelines were amended in 1992 to reduce the grant equivalency awards available to
the state's municipalities for water pollution abatement (Chapter 205, M.G.L.). The
category for hardship communities was abolished. 45 Furthermore, projects remained eli-
gible for 45 percent grant equivalency awards only if they were placed on the state's pri-
ority list before 1992. Thus, the Phase II design costs for Fall River's CSO project may
qualify for 45 percent grant equivalency assistance, but given other changes to the
MWPAT guidelines, it is quite definite that Fall River will not receive a similar equiva-
lency for the more costly Phase HI construction.
The 1992 Chapter 205 amendments reduced MWPAT loans from 45 percent to 25
percent grant equivalency for projects placed on the state's priority list in 1992 or after-
ward. A 25 percent grant equivalency is achieved by decreasing the interest rate subsi-
dies provided on MWPAT loans. Since the actual construction phase of Fall River's
CSO project has been postponed by a court decision, it will qualify at best for a 25 per-
cent award. Under this scenario, Fall River would have to triple its municipal sewer fees
or raise property taxes by 24 percent simply to finance the CSO project. However, there
is no guarantee that the project will be funded either in part or in its entirety, since the
MWPAT's own fiscal capacities are under stress. If Fall River is required to finance its
project entirely through its own resources, the city would be required to quintuple
municipal sewer fees or raise property taxes by 43 percent.
Consequently, as Fall River's CSO project has developed through its various phases,
federal and state financial assistance have steadily withered away. A CSO project
becomes more costly in each succeeding stage as it moves from Phase I planning to
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Phase II design to Phase III construction. Yet, in moving through each of these phases,
Fall River has encountered a steady decline in assistance, from a 90 percent grant for
the least expensive phase of the project, to a likely 45 percent grant for the slightly more
expensive Phase II design, to a possible 25 percent grant for construction of the CSO
facility. Moreover, given the MWPAT's fiscal constraints, there is a strong likelihood
that the city will have to finance all or part of the project through a municipal bond
issue paid for with dedicated increases in municipal sewer fees or property taxes.
However, under either scenario, calculations of projected debt ratio indicate that Fall
River may be required to exceed even the emergency debt ceiling established by state
law, which limits cities to a debt ratio of 5 percent of equalized assessed property val-
ues.
46 Thus, in order to comply with the federal CSO mandate, the city would have to
violate state laws concerning municipal finance or obtain a special waiver from the
state's Emergency Finance Board. Significantly, Fall River's Moody bond rating of
only Baal is already among the lowest in the state despite the city's merely average
per capita debt load.
Hence, in complying with the federal CSO mandate, it is quite possible that the
city's bond rating will fall to junk bond status, namely Bal or lower, and in using up
the city's available credit, the CSO project will crowd out approximately $100 million
in ready-to-go capital spending required to rebuild the city's ailing human and physical
infrastructure.
47
In effect, compliance with the federal court order could force Fall River
to sacrifice schools, fire and police protection, and drinking water improvements to
combined sewer overflow abatement. Nevertheless, Fall River has been forced to
move forward on the CSO project according to a strict timetable established by the
U.S. District Court without regard to fiscal realities. As a result, the city is wedged
between the mandate of a national policy and the constraints of local economic and
fiscal conditions.
The Prospects for Fiscal Relief
Any realistic appraisal of federal and state fiscal policies suggests that municipal
officials cannot expect any significant relief from unfunded water-quality mandates in
the foreseeable future. While a variety of legislation is pending at both the federal and
the state levels, this legislation, even if passed in toto, will still offer limited relief to
municipalities and ratepayers. Indeed, the structural gap between the costs of federal
water-quality mandates and the fiscal resources available to meet those mandates, which
continues to grow wider, is not likely to be closed during the remainder of the decade.
Pending legislative initiatives that claim to offer relief consist of two types: (1) direct
financial assistance to municipalities for water-quality improvements and (2) indirect
assistance to sewer ratepayers through individual tax subsidies. The most significant
direct-relief initiative pending at the federal level is a reauthorization of the Water
Quality Act, which had been expected to pass Congress by the end of 1994. It is widely
expected that the reauthorization, if it ever moves forward, will contain at least three
significant changes involving the financing of water-quality mandates. 48 First, the new
act was expected to provide an initial federal authorization to the state revolving funds
of $2.5 billion with the authorization increasing to $5.5 billion by FY 2000. Thus, if
Congress actually appropriates the full amount authorized by the Water Quality Act of
1994, and if individual states fully match the federal appropriation, the SRFs would
receive an additional $35 billion in capitalization by the end of the decade. Second, the
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new act will also create a special class of "hardship communities" defined as municipal-
ities in which sewer rates exceed a fixed percentage (most likely 1 .25%; of median
household income. Under the proposed language, state revolving funds will be allowed
to make negative-interest-rate loans, in effect a partial grant, to hardship communities,
if a state legislature passes separate legislation authorizing its SRF to grant negative-
interest-rate loans. Finally, the new act will probably authorize SRFs to extend the loan
repayment period from twenty to thirty or forty years for hardship communities, effec-
tively reducing the annual outlays of the affected municipalities by 25 percent or more,
although the total debt load will not be affected by this provision.
While such changes are an important step in the right direction, several caveats are
in order. Congress has indicated its intent to withdraw from any further financing of
water-quality improvements once the reauthorized Water Quality Act expires in FY
2000. By that time, Congress insists that the SRFs are to be fully self-financing revolv-
ing funds capable of meeting water-quality mandates without additional federal assis-
tance. However, the simple fact is that capitalization of the SRFs will not be sufficient
to meet the cost of existing water-quality mandates based on EPA estimates. The EPA's
most recent needs survey concludes that the known cost of meeting existing mandates
under the Clean Water Act will be $137.1 billion over the next twenty years. Combined
sewer overflow projects alone will require $41.2 billion during the same period. 49 So
even if Congress and the states appropriate the full $35 billion expected under the new
Water Quality Act, it will still leave an unfunded water-quality mandate of more than
$102 billion (of which CSOs are the single largest component).
Thus, the act will not fundamentally resolve the problem of unfunded water-quality
mandates. Consequently, unless key state governments plug the $102 billion structural
gap, many municipalities may receive no SRF assistance, or insubstantial amounts, for
otherwise SRF-eligible projects simply because of inadequate federal funding. Massa-
chusetts has made some effort to increase direct assistance during the last two fiscal
years. In FY 1994, the state appropriated an additional $30 million in direct grants to the
Massachusetts Water Resource Authority (MWRA) for rate relief in the forty-three com-
munities it serves. For FY 1995, the state approved an additional $50 million, including
$10 million for non-MWRA ratepayers. These special appropriations have helped to
slow the pace of rate increases in MWRA communities, but total state assistance is still
minuscule compared with the $7.7 billion in total documented needs — $2.7 billion for
CSOs — identified for Massachusetts by the EPA.50
Not surprisingly, as this structural gap continues to unwind, elected officials are
being pressured toward additional responses by a burgeoning ratepayers' revolt. Various
proposals for indirect tax relief have been proposed that aim to subsidize individual
ratepayers in municipalities burdened by water-quality mandates. For example, in 1993
Massachusetts amended its SRF statute to allow municipalities with enterprise funds—
a minority of the state's towns and cities — to repay the capital costs of SRF loans with
property tax revenue rather than sewer fees. 51 This change covertly effects a federal sub-
sidy through state legislation by making individual ratepayers eligible to use the proper-
ty tax deduction on federal personal income taxes as a way of defraying the costs of
sewer construction.
Significantly, however, such a change offers no relief to the vast majority of rate-
payers, even in eligible communities, because most taxpayers do not itemize deductions
on the federal income tax form. Similarly, Massachusetts senators Edward Kennedy and
John Kerry have proposed federal tax legislation that allows individuals to deduct from
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personal income taxes those portions of sewer and water bills which exceed one percent
of adjusted gross income. 52 This proposal suffers from the same problem as the state
plan, unless it is somehow structured differently from the existing property tax deduc-
tion to allow the deduction without itemization. Hence, nothing on the existing legisla-
tive agenda offers much promise of substantial relief for municipalities or ratepayers.
Indeed, at this point, it is not even clear whether Congress will reauthorize the Water
Quality Act.
Assessing the Cost of Compliance
A national policy that ignores local economic and fiscal capacities may be reasonable
when that policy includes a substantial effort to federally fund the mandate. In the past,
the local economic and fiscal impact of federal water-quality mandates was mitigated by
deep federal subsidies, particularly capital grants, that alter the cost-benefit equation
from a local standpoint. Furthermore, previous mandates for primary or secondary
treatment were far less costly than the available options for controlling combined sewer
overflows. For most municipalities, CSO abatement costs many times more than the
construction of secondary treatment facilities. 53 In this respect, the Water Quality Act
of 1987 and the EPA CSO control strategy have imposed far more costly mandates than
in the past during a period of declining federal assistance.
In this context, declining federal subsidies, uncertain state finances, a weak local tax
base, and a weak local economy can drastically shift the cost-benefit equation for the
construction of CSO facilities, particularly for declining and deindustrializing cities.
However, until recently there has been little concern for the economic and financial
calculations of municipalities to the extent that EPA regulations and court decisions
have consistently enforced a water-quality standards approach to the CSO problem in
the United States.
According to the EPA's own CSO benefit analysis guidelines, the water-quality
standards approach "assumes that certain water-quality standards are associated with the
protection of water uses . . . although the connection may not always be scientifically
defensible."5" Instead, biochemical water-quality standards establish regulatory guide-
lines as a surrogate measure of benefits, irrespective of whether any real marginal cost
benefits are realized by a local community subject to those standards. Interestingly, EPA
guidelines require communities to assess the comparative cost-benefit ratio of different
CSO abatement options after the federal mandate has been imposed, but the statutory
guidelines do not require an analysis of whether the mandate itself is economically and
fiscally feasible for a particular municipality.
However, because it is unlikely that significantly increased federal funding will be
forthcoming any time soon, it is necessary to establish criteria for allocating and target-
ing the limited resources available to those municipalities whose maximum water-quali-
ty improvement may occur with a minimum of economic and fiscal cost to municipali-
ties. Such criteria would allow for flexible enforcement of the CSO control strategy
along a continuum that would permit the postponement, delay, or extension of high-cost
CSO projects that are unlikely to produce any significant beneficial use from the antici-
pated water-quality improvements. Such decisions would be greatly enhanced if federal-
level environmental impact statements and state-level environmental impact reports
were considered by regulators and judges in conjunction with an economic and fiscal
impact statement.
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The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency took a significant step in this direction in
April 1994 in the final draft of its new combined sewer overflow control policy. It was
released to clarify the enforcement standards and implementation of EPA's 1989 strat-
egy. Although the new policy still requires municipalities to comply with technology-
based and water-quality-based CSO standards "as soon as practicable," for the first
time enforcement schedules are to be developed that consider financial feasibility for
municipalities in addition to the long-standing criterion of physical feasibility, that is,
technology-based standards. Thus, on publication of the new CSO control policy, EPA
administrator Carol M. Browner noted that it "recognizes the site-specific nature of
CSOs and their impacts and provides the necessary flexibility to tailor controls to
local situations."
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Nevertheless, the EPA's new regulatory guidelines apply only to the issuance of
NPDES permits and to EPA administrative orders. 56 Federal courts, as in Fall River,
are still not required to consider financial feasibility, and the federal court had until
recently been unwilling to consider any criterion other than physical feasibility in the
development of an implementation schedule. Hence, at this point the EPAs increasingly
flexible enforcement of CSO mandates and the federal court's literal enforcement of the
CSO mandate are creating two separate standards: a strict standard for municipalities
where private environmental groups have filed suit in federal court and a flexible stan-
dard for all other municipalities. The next logical step toward resolving these conflicting
standards would be to incorporate the EPA's new CSO control policy, particularly its
references to financial feasibility, into the Water Quality Act. Furthermore, the require-
ment that an economic and fiscal impact statement be weighed in the development of
any court-ordered enforcement schedule would at least introduce additional considera-
tions into judicial proceedings that would both encourage and allow greater flexibility in
deciding the speed and the extent to which the CSO mandate should be implemented in
particular municipalities. **•
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